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I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the functions of the U.S. National Administrative Office (NAO or Office), 
established under the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC or 
Agreement), is to receive, accept for review, and review submissions on labor law matters 
arising in Canada or Mexico. This is consistent with Article 16(3) of the NAALC, which 
states as follows: 
Each NAO shall provide for the submission and receipt, and periodically 
publish a list, of public communications on labor law matters arising in the 
territory of another Party. Each NAO shall review such matters, as 
appropriate, in accordance with domestic procedures. 
According to Article 49 of the NAALC, "labor law" means laws and regulations, or 
provisions thereof, that are directly related to, inter alia, freedom of association and the 
right to organize. l 
Pursuant to the procedural guidelines of the NAO, which became effective on April 
1, 1994,2 following a determination by the Secretary of the NAO to accept a submission for 
review, the Office shall conduct such further examination of the submission as may be 
1 Article 49 of the NA.\LC states: "'[L]abor law' means laws and regulations, or 
provisions thereof, that are directly related to: (a) freedom of association and protection of 
the right to organize; (b) the right to bargain collectively; (c) the right to strike; (d) 
prohibition of forced labor; (e) labor protections for children and young persons; (0 
minimum employment standards, such as minimum wages and overtime pay, covering wage 
earners, including those not covered by collective agreements; (g) elimination of 
em plo)'ment discrimination on the basis of grounds such as race, religion, age, sex, or other 
grounds as determined by each Party's domestic laws; (h) equal pay for men and women; 
(i) prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses; (j) compensation in cases of 
occupational injuries and illnesses; (k) protection of migrant workers. 
2 !'> Fed. Reg. 16660-2 (1994). 
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appropriate to assist the Office to better understand and publicly report on the issues 
raised. Within 120 days of acceptance of a submission for review, unless circumstances 
require an extension of time of up to 60 days, the Secretary of the NAO shall issue a public 
report, which shall include a summary of the proceedings and any findings and 
recommendations. 
II. SUBMISSIONS 
On February 14, 1994, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (lBT) filed a 
submission with the NAO (Submission #940001) concerning allegations inyolving the 
operation of an employer in Chihuahua, Mexico. On the same date, the United Electrical, 
Radio, and Machine 'Workers of America (UE) also filed a submission with the NAO 
(Submission #940002) concerning the operations of an employer in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico. 
A. SUMMARY: NAO SUBMISSION #940001 
The submission by the IBT concerns allegations involving the operations of 
HoneJwell Manufacturas de Chihuahua, S.A., in the city of Chihuahua, State of Chihuahua, 
Mexico. The plant manufactures electronics equipment, including thermostats, circuit 
boards, and heating and air purifier switches. It employs about 480 workers. The 
allegations of the submission relate principally to the right of freedom of association and 
the right to organize. 
According to the submission, workers at the Honeywell plant until recently were paid 
15 pesos a day or about $45 or less a week in wages and bonuses. The IBT claims that 
these are depressed wages and are exceptionally low even in maquiladora plants. The 
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submission further alleges that to maintain these Jow wages, Honeywell has used megal 
threats and firings to keep its employees from joining a union. 
The submission specifically alleges that on November 12, 1993, an officer of the 
Union of Workers of the Steel, Metal, Iron and Related Industries (Sindicato de 
Trabajadores de la Industria Metalica, Acero, Hierro, Conexos y Similares, STIMABCS), 
a union that is part of the Authentic Labor Front (Frente Autentico del Trabajo, FAT), an 
independent labor organization, held an organizing meeting in Chihuahua attended by 
twelve Honeywell workers. The meeting was not open to the public. One of the workers who 
attended the meeting was allegedly the leading supporter of the FAT at the plant. 
The submission alleges that in late November, Honeywell fired approximately 20 
production workers, nearly all of whom had expressed an interest in joining an independent 
union. The submission further alleges that the employees were told that they were being 
fired for their union activities and that they had to sign resignation forms to collect their 
severance pay, thus waiving their ability to file claims against their former employer 
protesting their dismissal. The submission also states that in connection with the firing of 
the employee who was the leading advocate for FAT in the plant, coercive measures were 
used to attempt to gain information about other pro-union employees. 
Finally, the submission states that one of the fired workers instituted a complaint 
against HoneywelJ before a Mexican Conciliation and Arbitration Board (Junta de 
Conciliaci6n y Arbitraje, CAB), which was pending at the time the submission was filed. 
According to the submission, CABs have a reputation for refusing to reinstate workers fired 
for supporting independent unions like the FAT. 
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The IBT submission claims that actions by Honeywell are in violation of Article 123 
of the Constitution of Mexico and that the company has violated the labor principles set out 
in Annex 1 of the NAALC. The relief requested in the submission is that: 
the NAO conduct a prompt review of the charges under Article 16 of the 
NAALC; 
• the NAO conduct a public hearing either in Chihuahua, Mexico, or in EI 
Paso, Texas, to take evidence on the charges; 
• the Government of Mexico require Honeywell to reinstate, "ith back pay, the 
20 workers dismissed in late November, 
the Government of Mexico require Honeywell to comply with Mexican law and 
the labor law principles set out in the NAALC; 
absent the reinstatement of workers, "'ith back pay, the U.S. Secretary of 
Labor request immediate consultations at the ministerial level pursuant to 
Article 22 of the NAALC; 
• if the aforementioned consultations are not successful, the U.S. Secretary of 
Labor use all other available remedies to address the matters being 
complained of; 
• the NAO request that the National Labor Relations Board begin appropriate 
rulemaking for whatever remedies may be needed to address the chilling 
effect of the alleged violations on the rights of IBT members and any injury 
to their economic interests; 
that the NAO develop standards and guidelines for determining when U.S. 
employers in Mexico violate the basic labor norms set out in Annex 1 of the 
NAALC and inform and publicize these standards or guidelines to U.S. 
companies by rulemaking or through other means; and 
the NAO develop a program of non-trade sanctions for U.S. companies 
operating in Mexico that violate the basic labor norms in Annex 1 of the 
NAALC, where these sanctions may include ordering employers to post 
notices in U.S. plants that they will comply with the basic norms in Annex 1 
of the NAALC and to bargain in good faith with U.S. unions to ensure that 
they "ill comply with the basic labor norms set out in Annex 1 of the NAALC 
when doing business in Mexico. 
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B. SUMMARY: NAO SUBMISSION #940002 
The submission by the UE concerns allegations involving the operations of the 
Compafiia Armadora, S.A., a subsidiary of the General Electric Company (GE), in Ciudad 
Juarez, State of Chihuahua, Mexico. Six affidavits from employees of the company were 
attached to and supported the submission. The allegations relate principally to the right 
of freedom of association and the right to organize. 
The su bmissionnotes that approximately two years ago, the UE formed a Strategic 
Organizing Alliance with the FAT. In order to develop closer ties between workers in the 
United States and Mexico, UE representatives travelled to Mexico in November 1993 to 
meet "lth Mexican workers. 
According to the submission, at a meeting on November 6, 1993, between employees 
of the Juarez facility who were attempting to organize an independent union at the plant 
and the delegation from the UE, the Mexican workers described the company's alleged 
efforts to suppress their union activity. Subsequent to the meeting, the submission asserts, 
Compafiia Armadora continued to engage in activities to curtail the organizing campaign 
and punish employees who had become involved. The submission states that the company's 
efforts included altering the established practice of plant entry to prevent employee 
organizers from distributing campaign literature, taking campaign literature from 
employees, and dismiSSing several employees, some of whom had taken part in discussions 
with the UE delegation. 
According to the submission, as many as 20 union activists were dismissed by the 
company. The submission states that under Mexican law, a dismissed employee has a right 
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to statutory severance pay based on length of service; in order to challenge a dismissal, 
however, an employee must agree to forgo the severance payment. The submission alleges 
that Compaiifa Armadora pressured workers into accepting the statutory severance pay and 
. relinquishing claims for reinstatement. 
The submission additionally charges Compaiiia Armadora with several health and 
safety violations, including failing to give light work to pregnant women, failing to provide 
adequate ventilation in work areas and suitable protective equipment, and failing to test 
properly employees for exposure to chemicals. The company is also charged with failing to 
pay overtime as prescribed by law. 
These allegations demonstrate, according to the submitter, that Compafiia Armadora 
has violated several provisions of Mexican law, including Articles 6, 7, and 123 of the 
Constitution, corresponding provisions of the Federal Labor Law, international law, and the 
labor principles set out in Annex 1 of the NAALC. The liE further asserts that the 
Government of Mexico has failed to enforce its labor law. The relief sought in the 
submission is that: 
the NAO initiate a review pursuant to Article 16 of the NAALC; 
the NAO hold a public hearing in Juarez, Mexico, or in EI Paso, Texas; 
Mexico require GE to comply with international and Mexican labor law, 
including by: respecting the rights of workers to communicate in furtherance 
of their interests; returning to the former practice of letting workers off the 
bus outside the company gates; instructing all management personnel that 
they stop snatching union leaflets out of the hands of workers; stopping 
discharging workers for union activity and without cause; ceasing pressuring 
workers into accepting statutory severance pay and relinquishing claims for 
reinstatement and immediately offering reinstatement with full back pay and 
lost benefits to workers who have been unjustly terminated; paying overtime 
properl)'; providing light work to pregnant women; complying with 
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requirements regarding health and safety; providing all workers with a copy 
of the work contract they signed with the company; providing any worker who 
may be discharged with a written statement of the reason for the discharge; 
posting notices at all U.S. and Mexican GE facilities setting forth in detail th~ 
corrective actions it is taking and stating its agreement to respect the laoor 
and human rights of its employees in the future; and sending a copy of said 
notice to all individuals and organizations who wrote to GE inquiring aoout 
the fired workers and to whom the company responded stating that the matter 
had been resoJved; 
in the event that the relief requested aoove of GE is not satisfactorily 
obtained, the NAO Secretary request that the Secretary of Laoor request 
consultations at the ministerial level pursuant to Article 22 of the NAALC; 
if the relief requested aoove of GE is not satisfactorily obtained after the 
ministerial consultations, the NAO recommend that the Secretary of Laoor 
request the establishment of an Evaluation Committee of Experts pursuant 
to Article 26 of the NAALCj 
if following the presentation of a final report by an Evaluation Committee of 
Experts the relief requested aoove of GE is not satisfactorily obtained, the 
NAO Secretary recommend dispute resolution under Part Five of the NAALC; 
and 
the NAO grant such further relief as it may deem just and proper. 
III. CONDUCT OF THE REVIEWS 
On April 15, 1994, within 60 days of their receipt, as required by its procedural 
guidelines, the NAO gave notice that Submissions #940001 and #940002 were accepted for 
review.3 In the notice announcing the initiation of the reviews, the NAO stated the 
rationale for initiation and the objectives of the reviews. The notice also indicated that 
acceptance for review of the submissions was not intended to indicate any determination as 
to the validity or accuracy of the allegations contained in the submissions. 
3 59 Fed. Reg. 18832-4 (1994). 
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A. INITIATION OF THE REVIEWS 
The NAO notice stated that initiation of the reviews was warranted because the 
submissions met the criteria for acceptance in Section G.2 of the NAO guidelines, i.e., they 
raised issues relevant to labor law matters in Mexico and a review would further the 
objectives of the NAALC. 
• The two submissions dealt primarily with freedom of association and the 
right to organize, issues that are clearly within the scope of labor law as 
defined by Article 49 of the NAALC. 
Reviews appeared to further the objectives of the NAALC, as set out in Article 
1, which include improving working conditions and living standards in each 
Party's territory; promoting, to the maximum extent possible, the labor 
principles set out in Annex 1 of the Agreement, among them freedom of 
association and the right to organize; promoting compliance with, and 
effective enforcement by each Party of, its labor law; and fostering 
transparency in the administration of its labor law. 
Although the specific events (dismissals) raised in the submissions occurred in 1993, 
prior to the entry into force of the NAALC, some of the workers were stm pursuing their 
reinstatement through the CABs at the time of the submissions. :Moreover, under the 
NAALC, the date that an event occurred is determinative only in considering whether there 
exists a "pattern of practice" required for establishing an Evaluation Committee of Experts. 
The labor law matters raised by the submissions (freedom of association and protections 
against dismissal because of efforts to organize) are not the basis for the establishment of 
an Evaluation Committee of Experts pursuant to Article 23 of the NAALC. 
B. OBJECTIVE OF THE REVIEWS 
Consistent with Section H.l of the NAO guidelines, the stated objective of the reviews 
was to gather information to assist the NAO to better understand and publicly report on 
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the Government of Mexico's promotion of compliance with, and effective enforcement of, 
its labor law through appropriate government action, as set out in Article 3 of .the NAALC. 
In particular, the initiation notice stated that the reviews would focus on promotion of 
compliance with, and effective enforcement of, labor laws that guarantee the right of 
association and the right to organize freely and prohibit the dismissal of workers because 
of efforts to exercise those rights. 
In conducting the reviews, the NAO gathered information from a variety of sources, 
including materials submitted by the IBT and UE, each of the companies named in the 
submissions, and the public at large in the context of a public hearing conducted by the 
NAO for the specific purpose of gathering information on the two submissions. In addition, 
the NAO has used information provided by the Mexican NAO in response to a request it 
made for information, reports prepared by expert consultants, and the available literature 
on the relevant topics. As stated above, the focus of the reviews has been on enforcement 
by the Government of Mexico of its domestic labor law with respect to the allegations raised 
by the submitters rather than on the conduct of individual companies. Moreover, the NAO 
is not an appellate body, nor is it a substitute for pursuing domestic remedies. 
C. INFOR.f\.1ATION FROM THE IBT AND UE 
In addition to the submissions filed with the NAO, the IBT and UE submitted 
additional information to the NAO in support of their allegations, including affidavits from 
affected workers. Letters from the IBT were received by the NAO on July 14 and August 
1, 1994, and from the UE on March 17, April 8, May 6 and 27, June 29, July 18 and 29, 
August 16 and 22, and September 2, 1994. 
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D. INFORMATION FROM COMPANIES 
The NAO notified Honeywell and GE of the initiation of the reviews and invited them 
to provide information on the issues raised. They submitted written statements for the 
record. 
Submission #940001: In a letter to the Secretary of the NAO dated May 24, 1994, 
a Honeywell official stated that the elimination of 23 positions that occurred in November 
1993 at the company's City of Chihuahua facility was part of a downsizing of the operation; 
22 workers were laid off and received full separation benefits, in accordance with Mexican 
law. The letter further stated that the 22 workers were considered good or satisfactory 
workers, and were informed that they would be eligible for rehire in the future if 
appropriate job openings became available; one of these workers was rehired when a factory 
opening occurred as a result of attrition and increased orders. 
According to the Honeywell official, one worker was terminated due to violations in 
,"Titten workplace rules and did not receive severance pay. This worker contested her 
termination with the Chihuahua Conciliation and Arbitration Board. On March 28, 1994, 
the Chihuahua Conciliation and Arbitration Board approved a settlement between the 
worker and the company. A March 30, 1994 letter from Honeywell to the Secretary of the 
NAO included as attachments a copy of the settlement documents approved by the 
Chihuahua Conciliation and Arbitration Board and a press release issued by the company. 
The press release stated that although the worker was dismissed because of workplace rule 
violations, lithe potential costs of continuing to pursue this case through administrative and 
legal processes under Mexican law clearly outweigh the costs of the settlement proposed by 
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[the worker's] ... attorney." 
Submission #940002: In a letter to the Secretary of the NAO dated May 19, 1994, 
a GE official restated the company's position (presented in a letter to the Secretary of the 
NAO dated April 5, 1994) that the NAO did not have jurisdiction under the NAALC to 
initiate a review of Submission #940002. The grounds stated for the objections were the 
following: (1) the complaint did not deal with a pattern of non-enforcement by the 
Government of Mexico' of Mexican labor law; (2) the complaint did not allege that the UE 
had made any attempt to resolve the complaint under Mexican law; and (3) the conduct in 
question predated the etTective date of the NAALC. Without waiving its position that the 
NAO improperly granted review on the matter, the GE official nevertheless presented 
factual representations regarding the case. 
According to the GE official, the following are the pertinent events: 
• 
• 
The terminations of workers that occurred between October 6, 1993, and 
December 2, 1993, were for various work rule violations. One worker was laid 
otT on October 6, 1993. 
At the request of the UE; GE management reviewed the terminations in 
question in December 1993. Having taken into account the severity of the 
work rule violations and the totality of the circumstances, management 
concluded that six of the terminations were not warranted. Management 
otTered reinstatement to the six workers despite having already reached 
termination agreements resolving all claims based on their employment with 
them. On or about December 20, 1993, management also otTered additional 
severance pay to the six atTected employees in the event they were not 
interested in reinstatement. 
The employees' representative responded to the company's attorney that they 
had elected the severance pay option. A formal agreement was signed and 
filed with the CAB and checks issued to all six workers. All six severance pay 
checks were cashed. Subsequently, the UE has asserted that the employees' 
representative never signed the settlement agreement although a likeness of 
his signature appears on documents certified by the CAB. Whether the 
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signature is a forgery is an issue that is currently before the CAB. 
Of the five terminated employees who did not receive reinstatement offers, 
three have signed settlement agreements with the company and two are 
contesting their terminations before the CAB. The employees claim that the 
terminations were motivated by their union activity while the Company 
contends that it had just cause for the terminations. 
These events taken in their entirety, argued the GE letter, are not indicative of a 
pattern of non-enforcement of Mexican labor law since the law protects the right of 
employees to form or join unions and provides employees legal recourse for any instance 
of wrongful discharge. Thus, asserts GE, Mexican labor law allows employers and employees 
to resolve their differences by means of a settlement agreement. 'Finally, the GE letter 
stated that the cases of the two workers who chose not to accept a settlement will be 
resolved by the CAB in the ordinary course of business. 
E. INFORl\1ATION FROM THE MEXICAN NAO 
In gathering information for this review, the U.S. NAO has consulted with its 
Mexican counterpart pursuant to Article 21 of the NAALC. On April 28, 1994, the 
Secretary of the NAO requested information from the Mexican NAO with regard to Mexican 
labor law and practice related to the matters raised by the two submissions. SpecificaJly, 
the Secretary of the NAO requested the following information from its Mexican counterpart: 
(1) sources for public information on labor laws, regulations, and procedures, both State 
and Federal, including text and commentaries; (2) explanatory material on Federal/State 
jurisdiction issues in labor Jaw generally, and regarding CABs specifically; (3) explanatory 
material on how the severance pay ("indemnizaci6n") system functions, including whether 
the government monitors for abuses; (4) CAB practice and procedure, at the State and 
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Federal levels, including statistics on the number of dismissal cases brought to the attention 
of the CABs resolved by severance pay settlements and by reinstatement; and (5) any 
publicly available information regarding the allegations made in the two submissions. 
The Mexican NAO responded on July 5, 1994. The response consisted of written 
explanations accompanied by source materials, such as the Constitution of the Republic, 
the Federal Labor Law, and other labor laws and regulations currently in effect. 
F. INFORMATION FROM EXPERTS 
The NAO also sought information and analyses from expert consultants on the 
matters raised by the two submissions. In particular, the NAO presented a list of questions 
to two sets of experts on Mexican labor law in the United States and contracted with these 
experts to provide information on labor law enforcement in Mexico and the role of the 
Federal and State CABs.4 The reports prepared by these experts were used in th< 
preparation of this report. 
G. PUBLIC HEARING 
On July 25, 1994, the NAO announced that a public hearing to gather information 
on matters related to the review of NAO Submission #940001 and NAO Submission 
#940002 would be held in Washington, D.C., on August 31, 1994.5 In the notice 
4 National Law Center for Inter·American Free Trade, Labor Law Enforcement in 
Mexico and the Role of the Federal and State Conciliation and Arbitration Boards, Report 
Submitted to the United States Department of Labor, U.S. National Administrative Office, 
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (July 26, 1994), henceforth Labor Law 
Enforcement in Mexico; Paul A. Curtis, Esq., Questions on Labor Law Enforcement in 
Mexico and the Role of the Arbitration and Conciliation Boards (September 7, 1.994), 
henceforth Questions on Labor Law Enforcement in Mexico. 
5 59 Fed. Reg. 38492·3 (1994). 
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announcing a public hearing, the Secretary of the NAO stated that the reviews of the two 
submissions would be consolidated for purposes of a public hearing since the subject matter 
of both submissions related principally to the right of freedom of association and the right 
to organize. Subsequently, the date of the public hearing was changed to September 12, 
1994.' 
At the September 12 hearing, which was conducted by the Secretary of the NAO, 14 
individuals presented public testimony. In addition, statements were received from four 
individuals or organizations prior to the hearing and from three individuals or 
organizations after the hearing. Testimony presented at the public hearings, as well as pre-
and post-hearing statements, were made part of the record. 
Pre-bearing Statements: Prior to the hearing, the Honeywell Corporation, the 
General Electric Company, the U.S. Council for International Business, and Ms. Barbara 
Eastman, Recording Secretary, Local 1292, United Auto Workers, Grand Blanc, Michigan, 
submitted statements. 
The statements from Honeywell and GE covered much of the same ground as earlier 
correspondence received from the companies. Honeywell explained its downsizing activities 
and the reductions in personnel that occurred. Honeywell further stated that the submitters 
have not presented evidence supporting the claim that there has been non-enforcement of 
labor law by the Government of Mexico. GE restated its view that the submissions did not 
present evidence of a pattern of non-enforcement by the Government of Mexico of its labor 
laws relating to freedom of association and the right to organize. 
6 59 Fed. Reg. 41511 (1994). 
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The U.S. Council for International Business stated its view that the NAO should not 
have accepted the two submissions for review and, moreover, should not hold ~ hearing on 
the matters raised by the submissions. The U.S. Council further wrote that allegations by 
the IBT and UE are directed at the behavior of individual companies; companies are not 
parties to the NAALC. At the time the submissions were filed, tbe disputes between 
workers and companies bad either been settled under Mexican law or no cbarge or 
complaint for remedial relief had been filed under Mexican administrative or judicial 
procedures. 
Ms. Eastman's statement was related to her participation in a demonstration held 
on May 20, 1994, in front of the GE plant in Ciudad Juarez to protest the firing of workers. 
She stated that GE management attempted to stop the passing of leanets, and management 
detoured company buses inside the plant gates so that the organizers could not distribute 
literature. Her statement also refers generally to working conditions in maquiladora plants. 
Statements were also fi1ed by witnesses that appeared at the hearing; tbeir views are 
summarized below. 
Bearing: The September 12 hearing was divided into four panels. At the 'outset of 
the bearing, the NAO Secretary made it clear that the hearing was being conducted to 
gather information to assist the NAO in preparing its public report, that the purpose of the 
bearing was not to adjudicate individual rights, and tbat it was not an adversarial 
proceeding. 
The first panel consisted of representatives of the two submitters, namely, Ron Carey, 
General President of the IBT, and Amy Newell, General Secretary-Treasurer of the UE. The 
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focus of Mr. Carey's testimony was on broad issues of labor law enforcement in Mexico. 
Mr. Carey specifically requested tbat tbe NAO bold field bearings and ask for additional 
information from tbe Mexican government and companies involved in tbe dispute raised 
by tbe submission. Ms. Newell criticized tbe NAO for not bolding a field bearing on tbe 
submissions, disallowing cameras in tbe bearing, and not accepting testimony on tbe recent 
election beld at tbe GE plant in Ciudad Juarez.7 
The second panel consisted of a representative of the UE, two Mexican workers, and 
a representative of the Mexican union STIMAHCS. The UE representative, Ms. Robin 
Alexander, summarized tbe major issues raised by the UE submission, including allegations 
of violations of tbe Mexican Constitution, Mexican Federal Labor Law, and international 
labor laws to wbich Mexico is a party. The violations related principally to freedom of 
association and the right to organize. Ms. Alexander also discussed wbat relief sbe thought 
sbould be obtained under the NAALC. 
The second panelist, Mr. Fernando Castro Hernandez, a former Compaiifa Armadora 
employee in Ciudad Juarez, discussed his experience of being dismissed from the Compaiifa 
Armadora plant because of organizing activities and for what he described as "causing 
problems." Among the acts that Mr. Castro said may bave prompted the company to 
dismiss bim were bis insistence tbat workers be provided with proper protective equipment 
for dealing witb chemicals and bis desire not to be transferred from one department to 
another. Mr. Castro said he was still waiting for a decision from the CAB regarding bis 
70n August 24,1994, a union representation election was held at Compaiiia Armadora. 
The election used a secret ballot procedure. The conduct of the election is tbe subject of 
a submission that was filed by the UE with the NAO on September 12, 1994. 
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dismissal from the company. 
The third panelist, Ms. Ofelia Medrano, a former employee of the Honeywell plant 
in Chihuahua, discussed her experience of being dismissed from Honeywell for participating 
in union organizing attempts. Ms. Medrano, a production operator at the plant, stated that 
she started to organize meetings at her home after failing to resolve safety and health issues 
with company supervisors. After being fired by the company, Ms. Medrano said she filed 
a complaint with the CAB seeking reinstatement, but later accepted severance pay due to 
personal financial reasons. 
The NAO Secretary inquired of Mr. Castro and Ms. Medrano whether they had 
contacted government officials about safety and health concerns at the plants where they 
worked. Both responded that they had not. 
The fourth panelist, Mr. Benedicto Martinez, discussed some of his experiences as 
an organizer for STlMAHCS. He discussed the difficulties of forming an independent union 
in Mexico, and the alleged monopoly that official unions have over the system. He also 
discussed what he called "mechanisms" used by companies and Mexican authorities to 
intimidate workers who \\'ish to form independent unions, including delaying the processing 
of complaints before the CABs so that workers win be forced for financial reasons to accept 
severance payments; accusing the employees of theft if they do not agree to resign; using 
"blank sheets," which are blank sheets of paper employees are forced to sign as a condition 
of emplo)'ment, that can later be completed by management to support the dismissal of a 
worker or force a resignation; delaying the registration of independent unions by Mexican 
authorities; and using "black lists," i.e., lists containing the names of workers who have left 
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a plant because of a labor dispute, which are distributed to other companies to warn them 
about these workers. 
The third panel was made up of four Mexican labor lawyers who testified about 
different aspects of the practice and enforcement of Mexican labor law. The first panelist, 
Mr. Arturo Alcalde, discussed the difference between the written Mexican labor law and how 
it is actually enforced, a concept he termed "simulation." One practice that he said takes 
place in companies is the formation of official unions before any workers request a union, 
so that any employee wishing to organize is forced to join the official union. Another 
practice is deliberate delays by Mexican authorities in registering independent unions. 
The second panelist, Mr. Jesus Campos, discussed problems encountered by 
independent unions attempting to organize workers at a plant and government preference 
for and support of official unions. :Mr. Campos described union registration procedures 
requ ired by law, which although seem simple on their face to satisfy, in reality are difficult 
and cumbersome because Mexican authorities are linked to official unions. Thus, 
independent unions are often not registered. 
The third panelist, Mr. Jorge Fernandez, also discussed the differences between 
Mexican labor law and how it is enforced. Mr. Fernandez cited several deliberate delaying 
techniques, often involving technicalities, used by Mexican authorities and official unions 
to thwart the formation of independent unions. He also discussed how Mexican authorities 
havc decreased the use of strikes as a bargaining technique by declaring strikes 
"nonexistent" if the strike was not previously approved. 
The fourth panelist, Mr. Gustavo de )a Rosa, discussed the use of "black lists" and 
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"blank sheets" to intimidate workers who might otherwise complain to Mexican authorities. 
He also described the maquiladora culture in the state of Chihuahua and characterized it 
as being very anti-union. 
The fourth panel was made up of three labor lawyers representing the IBT and a 
representative of the Ontario Federation of Labor. The first panelist, Ms. Judy Scott, 
presented several recommendations with regard to how the NAO should handle the 
submissions. The recommendations ranged from requiring the two companies involved in 
the submissions to reinstate workers, to asking companies to adhere to a code of conduct 
on worker rights for their operations in the maquiladora sector and elsewhere in Mexico 
that could serve as a model for companies engaged in NAFfA trade in the United States, 
Canada, and Mexico. In addition, Ms. Scott recommended sustained consultations among 
the NAOs to develop cooperative activities on associational and organizing rights. The~ 
include conferences for employee representatives explaining the NAALC and its principles 
and educating them about the different labor laws that cover the principles; similar 
conferences for representatives of employers; joint conferences where representatives of 
labor and management can discuss these issues; consultations between representatives of 
labor organizations from the United States, Canada, and Mexico representing employees 
from the same multinational employer along with representatives from management; 
development of "plain language" guides to worker and employer rights and responsibilities 
for widespread distribution; and conferences for field agents and labor inspectors for 
education and the exchange of ideas on the enforcement of labor laws. 
The second panelist, Mr. Earl Brown, recommended that the NAO communicate to 
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the companies involved in future submissions the importance of taking part in the hearings. 
The third panelist, Mr. Thomas Geoghegan, concentrated on whetber the "evidence" 
presented at the bearings required the triggering of ministerial consultations under the 
NAALC. Mr. Geoghegan argued that the use of severance pay seriously limits the number 
of complaints brought before Mexican CABs regarding the right to organize. Be argued 
that because the workers are not organized, they are not able to defend themselves from 
health and safety violations. For this reason, Mr. Geoghegan suggested that the NAO 
recommend ministerial consultations on health and safety issues in addition to freedom of 
association issues. The fourth panelist, Mr. Chris Schenck, described labor law in the 
Canadian province of Ontario, in an attempt to provide a comparative context for the 
current submissions. 
Post-hearing Statements: A post· hearing statement by the IBT dated September 19 
dealt in considerable detail with four issues: (1) rebutting the companies' interpretation of 
the NAALC concerning the scope of NAO review and of NAO.requested or NAO· 
recommended consultations; (2) drawing the attention of the NAO to key evidence elicited 
in the hearing regarding the enforcement issue; (3) arguing for giving greater weight to the 
oral testimony of witnesses than to written statements of the companies; and (4) pointing 
out the direct relevance of testimony on comparative information related to U.S. and 
Canadian labor law, and of suggested recommendations and cooperative consultations. 
The UE post-hearing statement elaborated on the allegations with respect to the 
Government of Mexico's failure to protect the organizational and associational rights 
contained in Mexican and international law and on the more specific allegations of labor 
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law violations against the two companies. The statement also discussed the indemnification 
(severance pay) system, which the UE argues deprives the vast majority of Me~can workers 
of access to the legal system and to the protection of laws designed to safeguard their rights. 
The UE requested that the public report to be issued by the NAO reaffirm the importance 
of freedom of assO(:iation and protection of the right to organize under the NAALC, as well 
as respect for, and compliance with, all Mexican and international labor laws and 
requirements. More specific requests of the NAO related to corrective actions that should 
be taken by the two companies, cooperative activities that should be undertaken with Mexico 
and Canada, and materials that should be prepared summarizing the rights accorded 
Mexican workers under Mexican and international law. 
Finally, in a statement dated September 19, Honeywell stated that it supported 
passage of the NAFrA and has cooperated fully with the NAO in voluntarily providing 
factual information on the submission presented .by the IBT. According to the statement, 
Honeywell has complied with all applicable Mexican laws in handling the downsizing of 
employment at its Chihuahua plant. The Honeywell statement set out that with respect to 
the one employee who was terminated, the settlement agreement that resolved her complaint 
before the CAB was proposed by the employee's attorney, not by the company. Finally, 
Hone~'Well argued that there are no matters pending before any Mexican governmental 
authority concerning the application or alleged violation of Mexican law in any matter 
relating to Honeywell. Honeywell concluded that since no Mexican labor law was violated 
and there are no unresolved complaints before Mexican authorities, there is no reason to 
conclude that there was any failure by the Government of Mexico to enforce its labor laws 
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in this matter. 
H. OTHER SOURCES OF INFORMATION 
The NAO has also relied on information from the available literature regarding 
Mexican law and practice related to freedom of association and the right to organize, 
including government reports,8 law review journals,9 and other sources of information.lo 
IV. ENFORCEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF MEXICO OF LABOR LAWS 
RELEVANT TO SUBMISSIONS 
Part II of the NAALC sets out the obligations that Parties to the Agreement 
undertake. Two key obligations relate to levels of protection (Article 2) and government 
enforcement action (Article 3). These articles state: 
Article 2: levels of Protection 
8 E.g., A Primer on Mexican Labor Law (Washington: U.S. Department of Labor, 
Bureau of International Labor Affairs, 1991); A Comparison of Labor Law in the United 
States and Mexico (Washington: U.S. Department of Labor, 1992); and Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices for 1993 ("'ashington: U.S. Department of State, 1994). 
9 E.g., Ann M. Bartow, "The Rights of Workers in Mexico," Comparative Labor Law, Vol. 
11 ("linter 1990); Amy H. Goldin, "Collective Bargaining in Mexico: Stifled by the Lack of 
Democracy in Trade Unions," Comparative Labor Law, Vol. 11 (Winter 1990); David L. 
Gregory, "The Right to Unionize in the United States, Canada, and Mexico: A Comparative 
Assessment," Hofstra Labor Law Journal, Vol. 10, no. 2 (Spring 1993); Oscar de la Vega 
Gomez, "Settlement of Labor Law Disputes in Mexico," Inter-American Law Review, Vol. 
21, no. 1 (1989); Susanna Peters, "Labor Law for the Maquiladoras: Choosing Between 
Workers' Rights and Foreign Investment," Comparative Labor Law, Vol. 11 ("'inter 1990); 
Mark Zelek and Oscar de la Vega, "An Outline of Mexican Labor Law," Labor Law Journal, 
Vol. 43, no. 7 (July 1992). 
lO E.g., Francisco Brena Garduno, Mexican Labor Law Summary (Mexico City: Brena 
y Asociados, 1991); Nestor de Buen· L., Derecho del Trabajo, Seventh Edition (Mexico: 
Editorial Porrua, 1989); Nestor de Buen L., Derecho Procesal del Trabajo (Mexico: Editorial 
Porrua, 1990); Dan LaBotz, Mask of Democracy: Labor Suppression in Mexico Todav 
(Boston: South End Press, 1992). 
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Affirming full respect for each Party's constitution, and 
recognizing the right of each Party to establish its own 
domestic labor standards, and to adopt or modify accordingly 
its labor laws and regulations, each Party shall ensure that its· 
labor laws and regulations provide for high labor standards, 
consistent with high quality and productivity workplaces, and 
shall continue to strive to improve those standards in that light. 
Article 3: Government Enforcement Action 
1. Each Party shall promote compliance with and 
effectively enforce its labor law through appropriate government 
action, subject to Article 42, such as: 
(a) appointing and training inspectors; 
(b) monitoring compliance and investigating suspected 
violations, including through on-site inspections; 
(c) seeking assurances of voluntary compliance; 
(d) requiring record keeping and reporting; 
(e) encouraging the establishment of worker-management 
committees to address labor regulation of the workplace; 
(I) providing or encouraging mediation, conciliation and 
arbitration services; or 
(g) initiating, in a timely manner, proceedings to seek 
appropriate sanctions or remedies for violations of its 
labor law. 
2. Each Party shall ensure that its competent .authorities 
give due consideration in accordance with its law to any request 
by an employer, employee or their representatives, or other 
interested person, for an investigation of an alleged violation of 
the Party's labor law. 
Thus, in accord with Article 3 of the NAALC, the issue at hand in the review of the 
two submissions is whether the Government of Mexico is enforcing its labor laws. A brief 
commentary on Mexican labor laws guaranteeing workers freedom of association and the 
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right to organize, and providing protections against dismissal of workers because of their 
exercise of the right to organize, is given in Appendix 1. A similar commentary on how the 
Government of Mexico implements its labor laws, particularly those laws relevant to the 
current review, is given in Appendix 2. 
The two submissions that are the subject ofthis review are based on alleged incidents 
that occurred at maquiladora plants located in the State of Chihuahua. Under the Mexican 
system of labor law administration, jurisdiction for the enforcement of labor laws in 
maquiladoras rests with state labor authorities. Thus, the CABs of the City and State of 
Chihuahua--rather than the Federal CABs-·are the proper authorities with jurisdiction for 
enforcement of the applicable labor law. 
A. STATE CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION BOARDS 
The State of Chihuahua has a state CAB; in addition, there are five other state CABs 
in the major cities of the State of Chihuahua. A claim can be brought by a plaintiff either 
where he or she works, where the contract was executed, or where the defendant is domiciled 
(Federal Labor Law, Article 700). The relevant board for the case involving workers at the 
Honeywell plant is the City of Chihuahua CAB; the corresponding board for Compafiia 
Armadora workers is the Ciudad Juarez CAB. 
According to a consultant's report, over the period June 1993 to June 1994, the City 
of Chihuahua CAB reportedly handled 1,862 complaints, resolving all but 173 (9 percent) 
through conciliation. Over the same time period, the City of Chihuahua CAB decided 650 
pending cases, thereby significantly reducing its workload. The average length of time in 
the City of Chihuahua CAB between the filing of a complaint and the rendering of a 
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judgment is 7.3 months. This is reportedly much shorter than with regard to other state 
CABs, where the time from filing of a complaint to a final judgment may be over one year 
(e.g., 1.4 years in the Hermosillo, Sonora, CAB).ll 
The Ciudad Juarez CAB reportedly handles more complaints than the four other 
boards of the State of Chihuahua combined. Nevertheless, the Ciudad Juarez CAB has been 
able to reduce the average adjudication time to 8.0 months, compared to 7.3 months for the 
City of Chihuahua CAB. From January through May 1994, 1,249 complaints were filed with 
the Ciudad Juarez CAB. Unlike the City of Chihuahua CAB, the Ciudad Juarez CAB does 
not engage in conciliation activities because of lack of personnel. Nevertheless, 1,050 of the 
1,249 complaints (84 percent) were settled by the Ciudad Juarez CABY 
According to a consultant's report, the Chihuahua CABs have been effective in 
improving the quality of decision making and reducing the time of handling cases.u 
Another consultant's report concluded that CABs generally, including the Chihuahua CABs, 
are known to be fair, impartial and unbiased, especially regarding their role in matters 
dealing \\ith the rights of individuals; in collective matters, however, their activity is deemed 
to be more controversial.14 One of the labor attorneys who participated in the NAO 
hearing stated, howeyer, that the labor courts in Ciudad Juarez specifically, and in Mexico 
11 Labor Law Enforcement in Mexico, QI!. cit., pp. 38-39. 
12 Labor Law Enforcement in Mexico, QI!. cit., p. 39. 
13 Labor Law Enforcement in Mexico, Ql!. cit., p. 47. 
14 Questions on Labor Law Enforcement in Mexico, QR. cit., p. 44. 
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generally, are biased in favor of companies, especially in matters of collective bargaining.Is 
B. NAO SUBMISSION #940001 
The sources that the NAO consulted regarding the submission filed by the mT are 
in agreement that, in November 1993, Honeywell Corporation terminated 23 workers from 
its Chihuahua plant. Twenty-two of the workersnlaid off from their jobs because of a 
company cost reduction plan, according to Honeywell; fired because of union activities, 
according to the UE--accepted full severance pay pursuant to applicable Mexican law and 
terminated their relationship with the company. There are no claims of improprieties in 
the City of Chihuahua CAB's approval of these severance arrangements. 
Also in November 1993, Honeywell dismissed one worker claiming that the dismissal 
was justified because the worker had repeatedly broken work rules. The IBT claims that 
this worker was fired because she was one of the leaders of the drive to unionize the plant. 
The worker in question filed a complaint with the City of Chihuahua CAB disputing the 
dismissal and requesting reinstatement. The City of Chihuahua CAB accepted her 
complaint and began the appropriate proceedings. This case was pending before the City 
of Chihuahua CAB at the time the submission was filed by the IBT. 
On February 28, 1994, the worker and Honeywell presented to the Cit}' of Chihuahua 
CAB an agreement they had reached to settle the outstanding dispute; in return for a 
monetary settlement, the worker agreed to relinquish her claim for reinstatement. 
Subsequently, the worker testified at the September 12 hearing held by the NAO that 
IS Testimony of Gustavo de la Rosa, NAO Hearing, September 12, 1994. Tr. at 70. 
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financial needs prompted the acceptance of the monetary settlement.16 No allegations have 
been made that the City of Chihuahua CAB acted improperly in approving th:e settlement 
of the dispute. 
C. NAO SUBMISSION #940002 
The sources that the NAO consulted regarding the submission filed by the UE are 
in agreement that, between October 6, 1993 and December 2, 1993, Compafiia Armadora, 
S.A., a su bsidiary of the General Electric Corporation, terminated several workers from its 
Ciudad Juarez plant. Apparently, 11 workers were dismissed; the company claims that the 
dismissals were for work rule violations, while the UE alleges that they were motivated by 
activities of the workers in trying to establish a union at the plant. 
Six of the workers accepted full severance pay pursuant to applicable Mexican law 
and terminated their relationship with the company. Subsequently, GE offered these 
workers the opportunity to be reinstated in their jobs, but the workers elected not to be 
reinstated and accepted an additional monetary settlement. The agreement between the. 
company and the employees was filed ~ith the Ciudad Juarez CAB and accepted by the 
latter. 
Five other workers were not offered reinstatement by the company. Three of these 
workers have reached settlement agreements ~ith GE and two have filed a petition with the 
Ciudad Juarez CAB seeking their reinstatement. The latter two cases are pending before 
the Ciudad Juarez CAB. In all of the cases where settlements were approved, there are no 
16 Testimony of Ofelia Medrano, NAO Hearing, September 12, 1994. Tr. at 38. 
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allegations that the Ciudad Juarez CAB acted improperly. 
The UE submission also raised allegations of violations of Mexican health and safety 
laws and regulations by the company. At the September 12 hearing, when asked directly 
by the NAO Secretary, a former Companfa Armadora worker who had voiced such 
complaints indicated that the alleged violations had not been brought to the attention of 
Government of Mexico authorities with jurisdiction over safety and health laws. 
V. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDA nONS 
As stated in the Federal Register notice announcing the commencement of the review 
of Submissions #940001 and #940002, and restated at the beginning of this report, the 
NAO review has focused specifically on the Government of Mexico's promotion of 
compliance with, and effective enforcement of, labor laws that guarantee the right of 
association and the right to organize freely and prohibit the dismissal of workers because 
of eflorts to exercise those rights. As such, the NAO review has not been aimed primarily 
at determining whether or not the two companies named in the submissions may have acted 
in violation of Mexican labor law. Moreover, the NAO is not an appellate body, nor is it 
a substitute for pursuing domestic remedies. Rather, the purpose of the NAO re"iew 
process, including the public hearing, is to gather as much information as possible to allow 
the NAO to better understand and publicly report on the Government of Mexico's 
promotion of compliance with, and effective enforcement of, its labor law through 
appropriate government action, as set out in Artic1e 3 of the NAALC. 
The review of the two submissions reveals disagreements about the events at each of 
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the plants. On the one hand, the two unions filing the submissions, as well as witnesses 
who testified at the September 12 hearing, suggest that the separations were motivated by 
the desire of the companies to impede the formation of unions. The two unions further 
allege that workers were dismissed for these activities. Moreover, in their view, workers 
were coerced by the employers or compelled by personal economic hardships to accept 
settlement payments, rather than seek reinstatement. On the other hand, statements by the 
two companies suggest that the separations (terminations or layoffs) of workers that 
occurred were the result of either company downsizing or failure on the part of workers to 
perform their duties according to established rules. Further, the companies assert that they 
complied with Mexican labor law in the separations and paid the required severance 
payments. 
During the review, a number of other relevant issues regarding enforcement of labor 
law in Mexico, particularly in the maquiladora sector, were brought to the attention of the 
NAO. They include the difficulties in establishing unions in Mexico, the hurdles faced by 
independent unions in attaining legal recognition, company black listing of union activists, 
the use of blank sheets, and government preference for and support of official unions. 
Another such issue was the very high percentage of Mexican workers dismissed from 
their jobs who elect to take severance pay rather than seek reinstatement--which is their 
right under Mexican labor law. Apparently, workers generally do not have the financial 
resources to pursue reinstatement before the CABs, often opting for the settlement of their 
complaints in return for money. In a post-hearing brief, the UE asserts that the lack of an 
unemplo),ment insurance system in Mexico contributes to the very high percentage of cash 
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settlements. Thus, according to this line of argument, the right of workers whose 
employment has been terminated because of their exercise of the right to organize is de 
facto limited by their inability to survive economically until the process of reinstatement 
works its course. 
A related problem articulated by the workers who provided information to the NAO 
is their perception of impediments in obtaining legal remedies. These impediments include 
the delays that are common in receiving decisions from CABs and the related economic 
hardship caused by having to wait while not earning an income. It appears, however, that 
dismissed workers were aware of their options under the law and chose to take severance 
over reinstatement. Therefore, it is very difficult to ascertain whether there has been a 
violation of freedom of association when severance is preferred over a review of the case by 
a CAB. However, the NAO notes that the timing of the dismissals appears to coincide with 
organizing drives by independent unions at both plants. 
The NAO acknowledges and understands that the economic realities facing these 
Mexican workers may have made it very difficult to engage the proper Mexican authorities 
in addressing labor law violations. However, since workers for personal financial reasons 
accepted severance, thereby preempting Mexican authorities from establishing whether the 
dismissals were for cause or in retribution for union organizing, the NAO is not in a 
position to make a finding that the Government of Mexico failed to enforce the relevant 
labor laws. Even in those instances where one of the companies publicly admitted that its 
local managers went too far in dismissing certain workers and offered them reinstatement, 
the workers (who had already accepted a cash severance to settle their cases) chose not to 
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be reinstated and again accepted a larger cash severance. While such an about-face by one 
of the companies suggests that management may not have acted properly in the dismissals, 
the dismissed workers neither accepted reinstatement nor challenged management's action"s 
before the CAB. The very few workers in the two submissions who chose to challenge their 
dismissals have availed themselves of due process under Mexican law and a judgment is 
pending. 
The NAO also finds that there is a dearth of practical knowledge in each of the three 
signatory countries to the NAALC about legislation in the other countries that guarantees 
the right of freedom of association and the right to organize. The practical availability of 
these rights is an issue of concern to Mexican workers, as demonstrated by the two 
submissions. Freedom of association and protection of the right to organize, the right to 
bargain collectively, and the right to strike are among the labor principles that each of the 
signatories to the NAALC has committed to promote, subject to each Party's domestic law. 
In this regard, the NAO recommends that the three countries work together to 
develop cooperative programs regarding freedom of association and the right to organize 
pursuant to Article 11 ofNAALC. For example, the three countries might initially consider 
a government-to-government trinational seminar or conference on freedom of association 
issues (Jaw, enforcement authorities, enforcement record) with participation from 
state/provincia] authorities. This could be followed-up in the future with other events that 
involve the business and labor communities in each of the three countries. 
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Finally, the NAO finds that there could be improved efforts to communicate to the 
public details about the NAALC and its operation: the labor principles that it covers; the 
laws in each country that concern these rights; the obligations undertaken by the 
signatories; the mechanisms to provide oversight of enforcement; and the role of the NAOs. 
For this reason, the NAO recommends that each of the three countries undertake a public 
information and education program to make their public aware of the Agreement, how it 
works, the institutions it creates, the oversight mechanisms that it provides, and the 
remedies that are available. Along this line, the three countries might consider holding one 
or more conferences for worker and employer organizations regarding the NAALC and 
additional conferences bringing together individual workers and employers. The Secretariat 
of the Commission for Labor Cooperation, once that institution is operational, should be 
requested to prepare explanatory materials on the NAALC, its institutions and its 
implementation, for wide distribution in the three countries. 
In conclusion, the NAO does not recommend ministerial consultations on these 
matters under Article 22 of the NAALC. The information available to the NAO does not 
establish that the Government of Mexico failed to promote compliance with or enforce the 
specific laws involved. However, the NAO shares the submitters' concerns about the vital 
importance of freedom of association and right to organize and the implications for workers 
of the failure of governments to protect such rights. Accordingly, the report makes several 
suggestions for cooperative activities under Article 11 of the NAALC on the issues of 
freedom of association and the right to organize and for public information and education 
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programs regarding the NAALC. 
-" ~ 
.~ 
, 
,-
\'Irtisema Garza 
Secretary, National Administrative Office 
* * * 
Based on the foregoing report, I accept the NAO's recommendation not to request 
ministerial consultations under Article 22 of the NAALC on NAO Submission #940001 or 
Rob . elch 
Secretary of Labor 
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APPENDIX I 
MEXICAN LABOR LAWS 
Mexican labor law guaranteeing workers freedom of association and the right to 
organize and providing protections against dismissal of workers because of their exercise 
of the right to organize is based on Article 123 of the Political Constitution of the United 
Mexican States, adopted in 1917.1' These Constitutional rights are regulated by Title II 
and Title VII of the Federal Labor Law (Ley Federal del Trabajo).18 Mexico has ratified 
one of the basic Conventions of the International Labor Organization, Convention 87, which 
grants workers the freedom to associate and protects their right to organize. 
A. CONSTITUTION 
The legal framework of Mexican labor law is Article 123 of the Political Constitution 
of the United Mexican States. Section X'VI of Article 123, which guarantees the right of 
workers to organize, states as follows: 
Both employers and workers shall have the right to organize for 
the defense of their respective interests, by forming unions, 
profeSSional associations, etc. 
Section XXII of Article 123 provides protections against dismissal of workers because 
of their exercise of the right to organize. This Section states, in part: 
17 "Articulo 123 Constitucional," reprinted in Secretaria del Trabajo y Previsi6n Social 
. , 
Ley Federal del Trabajo, 9th Edition (Mexico, 1992), pp. 9-20. 
18 The first Federal Labor Law took effect in 1931; it was modified numerous times over 
a 30-year period and superseded by a new Federal Labor Law in 1970. The latter legislation 
has also been modified frequently. The most recent major revision of the FLL was done in 
1980. 
A-I 
An employer who dismisses a worker without justifiable cause 
or because the worker has entered an association or union, or 
for having taken part in a lawful strike, shaH be required, at 
the election of the worker, to either fuUm the contract or 
indemnifY him in the amount of three months' wages. The law 
shaH specifY those cases in which the employer may be 
exempted from the obligations of fulfiJling the contract by 
payment of an indemnity. 
B. FEDERAL LABOR LAW 
The Federal Labor Law (FLL) codifies Mexican labor law. Title II, which deals with 
labor law applicable to individuals, addresses, inter alia, the dismissal of workers. Title VIJ 
of the FLL deals with collective labor relations. 
Freedom of Association and Right to Organize 
Article 354 of the FLL recognizes the freedom of workers and employers to form 
associations. Article 357 provides that workers and employers are free to form unions 
without prior authorization. Article 358 states that no one can be forced to join or not to 
join a union. 
Formation of Unions: Article 356 of the FLL defines a union as "the temporary 
association of workers or employers for the study, advancement and defense of their 
respective interests." 
Since no prior authorization is needed to form a union (Article 357), the only 
requirements in the FLL regarding the formation of unions are those dealing with how 
many workers are needed to form one and who is eligible for membership. 
• Article 364 states that the formation of a union requires twenty workers in 
active service. 
• Article 363 states that workers occupying "positions of trust" may not join 
unions. 
A·2 
• Article 362 provides that only workers older than 14 years of age can join a 
union. 
Recognition orUnions: In order to be officially recognized, unions must register with 
the Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare (Secretarfa del Trabajo y Previsi6n Social, 
STPS) in instances where the Federal Government has jurisdiction, and with the local CAB 
in instances where local jurisdiction applies. Registration requires the presentation of the 
following documents: (1) a certified copy of the minutes of the general meeting at which the 
union was established; (2) a list of the names of the members and of their employers; (3) 
a certified copy of the by-laws; and (4) a certified copy of the minutes of the meeting at 
which the Board of Directors was elected (FLL, Article 365). 
Once the required documents are presented to STPS or a CAB, registration occurs 
within 60 days unless the registering authority determines that: (1) the purposes of the 
union do not coincide with those set out in Article 356 (lithe study, advancement and defense 
of the .... [rights of workers],'); (2) the union does not have the minimum number of workers 
established by Article 364 (20 workers); or (3) the union has not submitted all of the 
documents required by Article 365 (FLL, Article 366). 
Union by-laws must contain the following: (1) the name of the union; (2) its address; 
(3) its objectives; (4) the time period for which it was established; (5) conditions for 
membership; (6) obligations and rights of members; (7) causes and procedures for 
expulsion; (8) procedures for holding meetings; (9) procedures for the election of a board 
of officers; (10) length of tenure of officers; (11) regulations regarding the management of 
the assets of the union; (12) form of payment and amount of union dues; (13) dates for 
presentation of financial statements; (14) rules for liquidating union assets; and (15) other 
rules approved by the membership (FLL, Article 371). 
Dismissal of Workers 
Under Mexican labor law, employment contracts may be for a specified job or period, 
or for an indefinite period; in the absence of express stipulations, the employment contract 
shall be for an indefinite period (FLL, Article 35). 
Article 46 authorizes a worker or an employer to sever the work relationship for 
cause without incurring any further responsibility. Other articles of the FLL address 
specific causes whereby a worker may be subject to dismissal ("rescission") and remedies 
available to workers who are dismissed, including severance pay ("indemnification"). 
Dismissal for Cause: Article 47 sets out the specific conditions whereby a worker 
may be dismissed without further responsibility for the employer: 
If the worker, or the union which had proposed or recommended the worker, 
deceives the employer with false certificates or references showing that the 
employee has ability, competency and faculties that the worker does not 
possess. This cause for dismissal shall cease to have effect thirty days after 
the worker started rendering his services; 
If the worker, during working hours, commits dishonest or violent acts, makes 
threats, offends or mistreats the employer, the employer's family or the 
officers or administrative personnel of the enterprise or establishment, unless 
there is provocation or he acts in self-defense; 
If the worker commits any of the offenses listed in the preceding paragraph 
against co-workers and, as a result of such actions, the discipline in the place 
of employment is altered; 
If the worker, outside of working hours, commits any of the offenses referred 
to in the preceding paragraphs against the employer, the employer's family 
or the officers or administrative personnel, and the offense is of such serious 
nature that it makes the work relationship impossible; 
If, during the performance of his work or by reason of it, the worker 
intentionally causes material damage to the buildings, works, machinery, 
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instruments, raw materials and other things related to the work; 
• If the worker causes serious damage of the kind mentioned in the preceding 
paragraph, not wilfully but through negligence; . 
If the worker, through negligence or inexcusable carelessness, jeopardizes the 
safety of the establishment or of the persons in it; 
If the worker commits immoral acts in the establishment or place of 
employment; 
If the worker reveals manufacturing secrets or confidential matters to the 
detriment of the enterprise; 
If the worker is absent more than three times within a thirty-day period, 
without permission from the employer or without reasonable cause; 
• If the worker disobeys the employer or the employer's representative, without 
reasonable cause, in matters related to the work under contract; 
If the worker refuses to adopt preventive measures or to follow the established 
procedures indicated to avoid accidents or illnesses; 
If the worker conies to work in a state of drunkenness or under the influence 
of a narcotic or depressant drug, unless there is in the latter case a medical 
prescription. Before starting work, the worker shall make this fact known to 
the employer and present the prescription signed by the doctor; 
• A final judgment imposing a prison sentence on the worker, which prevents 
the worker from fulfilling the employment contract; and 
Causes similar to those set forth in the preceding paragraphs, of equal 
seriousness and of similar consequences insofar as the work is concerned. 
Employers are required to give notice in writing to the worker of the date and cause of the 
dismissal. 
Remedies: Article 48 of the FLL grants mandatory reinstatement to dismissed 
workers who hold permanent jobs. It states: 
The worker may, at his election, request from the Conciliation 
and Arbitration Board to be reinstated in his job, or to receive 
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an indemnification equal to three months' salary. If the 
employer fails to show the cause for dismissal in the 
proceedings, the worker shall be entitled, in addition to 
whatever the action exercised might have been, to be paid the 
salaries accrued from dismissal to the effective date of the 
award. 
According to Article 49, an employer may be exempt from the obligation to reinstate 
a worker, provided the appropriate indemnification pursuant to Article 50 has been paid, 
in the following cases: (1) when the worker has been employed for less than one year; (2) 
when the employer shows before the CAB that the worker, because of the work perfonned 
or the characteristics of the job, is in direct and permanent contact with the employer and 
the CAB considers that a normal relationship is not possible; (3) when the worker is a 
confidential employee; (4) when the worker is engaged in domestic service; and (5) when the 
worker is engaged in occasional work. 
The indemnifications provided by Article 50 are: (1) an amount equal to salaries for 
one-half of the period of service rendered if the emplo)'ment contract was for a definite 
period of less than one year; (2) an amount equal to salary for six months for the first year 
and for twenty days for each subsequent year of service if the employment contract exceeded 
one year; (3) the salary of twenty days for each year of service rendered if the employment 
contract was for an indefinite period; and (4) in addition to the indemnification referred to 
above, an amount equal to three months' salary, plus the salaries accrued from the date of 
dismissal until the indemnifications are paid. 
C. INTERNATIONAL LAW 
According to Mexican law, international conventions and agreements entered into by 
Mexico become part of Mexican law upon ratification by the Senate. This applies to 
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Conventions of the International Labor Organization (ILO), provided the conventions do 
not contravene the principles embodied in Article 123 of the Constitution.19 Article 6 of 
the FLL states: 
The laws and treaties entered into and approved in the tenns 
of Article 133 of the Constitution, shall be applicable to the 
employment relations in all aspects that are beneficial to 
workers from the effective date of such law or treaty. 
As of June 1, 1993, Mexico had ratified 74 ILO Conventions.2o In particular, 
Mexico has ratified Convention 87, "Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 
Organize." Convention 87 was adopted in 1948 by the International Labor Conference, a 
tripartite body composed of government, employers' and workers' delegates from member 
States of the ILO. The Mexican Senate's ratification of Convention 87 was published in the 
Diario Oficial de la Nadon on October 16, 1950.21 
The aim of Convention 87 is "the right, freely exercised, of workers and employers, 
without distinction, to organise for furthering and defending their interests.fl2l The key 
provisions of Convention 87 are: 
Workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, have the right to 
establish and to join organizations of their own choosing with a view to 
19 Nestor de Buen L., Derecho del Trabaio, Seventh Edition (Mexico: Editorial Porrua, 
1989), Volume 1, p. 416. . 
20 International Labour Conference, 80th Session, 1993, Lists of Ratifications by 
Convention and by country (as at 31 December 1992), Report III (Geneva: International 
Labour Office, 1993), p. 241 and addendum updating the infonnation through June 1, 1993 . 
. 21 Nestor de Buen L., Derecho del Trabajo, Seventh Edition (Mexico: Editorial Porr6a, 
1989), Volume 1, p. 418. 
22 International Labour Office, Summaries of International Labour Standards, Second 
edition (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1991), p. 5. 
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furthering and defending their respective interests. 
Such organizations have the right to draw up their own constitutions and 
rules, to elect their representatives in full freedom, to organize their 
administration and activities and to formulate their programs. Public 
authorities shall refrain from any interference which would restrict this right 
or impede the lawful exercise of this right. 
The organizations shall not be· liable to be dissolved or suspended by 
administrative authority. 
• Organizations have the right to establish and join federations and 
confederations which shall enjoy the same rights and guarantees. The 
Convention also provides for the right to affiliate with international 
organizations. 
The acquisition of legal personality by all these organizations shall not be 
subject to restrictive conditions. 
• In exercising the rights provided for in the Convention, employers and 
workers and their respective organizations shall respect the law of the land. 
The law of the land and the way in which it is applied, however, shall not 
impair the guarantees provided for in the Convention. 
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APPENDIX II 
IMPLEMENTATION OF MEXICAN LABOR LAWS 
Mexican labor Jaw is of the competence of the federal government and applies 
throughout the entire nation. Neither the states nor the Federal District have the power to 
issue labor legislation.23 Pursuant to Section XXXI of Article 123 of the Mexican Political 
Constitution, implementation of labor law is under the purview of state authorities in their 
respective jurisdiction. However, matters involving work arrangements related to conflicts 
that affect two or more states; collective contracts which are declared to be binding in more 
than one state; training; occupational safety and health; or the following industries fall 
exclusively within the federal jurisdiction: 
Textiles; 
Electricity; 
Cinematography; 
Rubber; 
Sugar; 
Mining; 
• Metals and steel, including the mining, processing and smelting of basic 
minerals, and the production of iron and steel and finished products from 
iron and steel; 
• Hydrocarbons; 
23 Francisco Brena Garduno, Mexican Labor Law Summary (Mexico City: Brena y 
Asociados, 1991), p. iv. 
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• Petrochemicals; 
• Cement; 
• Lime; 
• Automobiles and parts; 
• Chemicals, including pharmaceuticals and medications; 
Cellulose and paper; 
• Oils and vegetable fats; 
• Packed, canned or packaged foods; 
• Bottled or canned beverages; 
• Railroads; 
• Wood products, including saw mill products, plywood and particle board; 
Flat glass and glass bottles; and 
Tobacco processing and manufacturing. 
Federal jurisdiction also applies to matters regarding the following enterprises: 
• Those that are under direct or indirect administration by the federal 
government; 
• Those that operate pursuant to a federal contract or grant and related 
industries; and 
• Those that operate in federal zones or areas under federal jurisdiction, in 
territorial waters or within the exclusive economic zone of the nation. 
A. CONCILIA TION AND ARBITRATION BOARDS 
Disputes between labor and management in Mexico are the purview of a system of 
Conciliation Boards (Juntas de Conciliaci6n) and Conciliation and Arbitration Boards 
(Juntas de Conciliaci6n y Arbitraje). Section XX of Article 123 of the Mexican Political 
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Constitution states: 
Differences or disputes between capital and labor shall be 
subject to the decisions of a Conciliation and Arbitration 
Board, consisting of an equal number of representatives of 
workers and employers, with one from the government . 
. Among the labor-management disputes subject to the auspices of Conciliation Boards and 
Conciliation and Arbitration Boards are those related to freedom of association and 
dismissal of workers. 
Section XXI of Article 123 compels employers to use the CABs to resolve disputes 
and to accept awards made by CABs. This Section states: 
If an employer refuses to submit his differences to arbitration 
or to accept the decision rendered by the Board, the labor 
contract shall be considered terminated and he shall be 
obligated to indemnity the worker the amount of three months' 
salary in addition to any liability resulting from the dispute ... 
Conciliation Boards have limited scope and are not permitted to sit as adjudicative 
bodies. Jurisdiction between local and federal Conciliation Boards or Conciliation and 
Arbitration Boards is determined on the basis of subject matter (see above). 
Federal Conciliation and Arbitration Boards 
The Federal Conciliation Boards (Juntas Federales de Conciliaci6n, FCBs) and 
Federal Conciliation and Arbitration Boards (Juntas Federales de Conciliaci6n y Arbitraje, 
FCABs) are regulated, respectively, by Chapters X and XII, Title Eleven, of the FLL. 
FCBs consist of three members: a representative from government, appointed by the 
Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare, who will act as President; and a representative each 
from organized labor and from employers (FLL, Article 593), In addition to promoting the 
resolution of labor disputes, the main duties of the FCBs include receiving claims and 
A-ll 
forwarding them to Special Boards or to FCABs; gathering evidence that workers or 
employers intend to bring before FCABs; acting as FCABs in instances where benefits 
involving less than three months' salary are involved; and assisting the FCABs in the 
performance of their duties (FLL, Article 600). 
The FCAB consists of representatives from government and from workers and 
employers, with the latter representing different sectors of the economy (FLL, Article 605). 
The President of the FCAB is appointed by the President of the Republic (FLL, Article 612). 
According to Article 604, the FCAB "shall hear and resolve labor conflicts between workers 
and employers, or among workers only, or employers only, which derive from labor relations 
or from events closely associated with such relations." The FCAB may operate as a 
Committee of the Whole or establish Special Boards to deal with specific issues. 
Local Conciliation and Arbitration Boards 
Local Conciliation Boards (Juntas Locales de Conciliaci6n, LCBs) and Local 
Conciliation and Arbitration Board (Juntas Locales de Conciliaci6n y Arbitraje, LCABs) 
are regulated, respectively, by Chapters XI and XIII, Title Eleven, of the FLL. 
LCBs operate in each state of the nation, as determined by the Governor of each 
state (FLL, Article 601). The functions of LCBs are the same as those of the Federal 
Conciliation Boards (FLL, Article 603). Similarly, LCABs function in each state of the 
nation to deal with labor conflicts that are not subject to federal jurisdiction (FLL, Article 
621). LCABs are subject to the same rules, and have the same functions, as the Federal 
Conciliation and Arbitration Boards (FLL, Article 623). The President of the LCABs is 
appointed by the Governor of each state (FLL, Article 623). 
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B. PROCEDURES OF CABs 
CABs do not intervene in labor disputes unless requested to do so by the complaint 
of a plaintiff. Workers seeking the intervention of CABs in complaints against an employer 
alleging denial of freedom of association and dismissal without cause must begin their case 
by filing a written document with the appropriate CAB (FLL, Article 871). In addition to 
laying out the facts of the case, the petition may be accompanied by supporting evidence 
(FLL, Article 872). Within 24 hours of receipt of a petition, the Full CAB or a Special CAB 
win announce the date and time for holding a conciliation hearing •• which must be within 
15 days of the filing of the petition-.and notify all of the parties at least 10 days in advance 
of its occurrence; the CAB will also make available a copy of the petition to the defendant 
(FLL, Article 873). 
Hearings before CABs consist of three stages: (1) conciliation; (2) arguments; and 
(3) presentation of evidence. All three stages take place consecutively, typicaHy within the 
same business day. 
Conci1iation 
The strong preference of the drafters of the FLL for conciliation and negotiated 
resolution of disputes is evident in this stage of the CAB hearings, which are conducted by 
Conciliation Boards (FLL, Article 876): 
• 
• 
parties are required to appear in person, "without attorneys, advisers, or 
proxies"; 
the Board will promote dialogue between the parties and encourage them to 
reach a settlement; 
if the parties reach an agreement, the conflict is deemed to be terminated; 
after approved by the Board, the agreement shall have the legal force of an 
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award; and 
• tbe parties are given the opportunity to request the suspension of tbe bearing 
in order to work out a settlement; tbe Board can grant the suspension only 
once and for up to eight days. 
Only if these efforts at conciliation are unsuccessful will the bearing move into tbe next 
stage. Failure of one of the parties to attend the conciliation stage is deemed as an 
unwillingness to reach an agreement and the case is moved to the next stage. 
Arguments 
Upon being notified by the Conciliation Board that its efforts to reach an agreement 
have been unsuccessful and receiving documentation to this effect, the CAB summons tbe 
parties to a hearing to present their arguments (FLL, Article 877). At tbe bearing, tbe 
President of the CAB again urges the two parties to settle their differences; if this call for 
conciliation is unsuccessful, the two parties proceed to make their arguments (FLL, Article 
878): 
• the plaintiff has an opportunity to present his or her case, amending it as 
appropriate from the time the original complaint was filed; 
• the defendant is similarly given the opportunity to reply to the plaintiff's 
arguments either orally or in writing; the defendant is instructed to address 
each of the allegations made by the plaintiff; and 
• parties have a brief opportunity to cross-examine each other. 
The conclusion of the arguments stage leads into the presentation of evidence stage. If the 
parties concur on the facts of the case and the only differences relate to matters of law, the 
process is ended without going through the presentation of evidence stage. 
The arguments stage takes place even jf one of the two parties is not in attendance. 
If the plaintiff is absent, his or her arguments are limited to those that were presented in 
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the original complaint. Failure of the defendant to appear is construed as acceptance of the 
facts contained in the plaintitT's complaint, although "without prejudice to showing during 
the presentation of evidence stage that the plaintiff was not a worker or an employer, that 
there was no dismissal, or that the facts alleged in the complaint are untrue" (FLL, Article 
879). 
Presentation of Evidence 
The last stage in the hearing conducted by the CAB is the presentation of evidence. 
The plaintiff is first allowed the opportunity to present evidence supporting his or her 
complaint; the defendant is also allowed an opportunity to introduce evidence rebutting that 
presented by the plaintiff. Counter-arguments can occur (FLL, Article 880). Immediately 
following, the CAB rules on which evidence is admissible, the CAB hears the evidence and 
issues a ruling (laudo or award) (FLL, Article 889). 
Decisions of CABs are final and are fully enforceable by them. The Presidents of the 
CABs act as enforcement authorities of CAB decisions and as such decide which are the 
best enforcement measures to ensure execution of their decisions (FLL, Article 940). Under 
some circumstances, the President of a CAB has the authority to garnish property of a 
defendant to guarantee payment of an award. 
The constitutionality of CAB decisions is subject to review by the Federal District 
Courts, Federal Courts of Appeal, and the Mexican Supreme Court. The procedure for 
appealing an award requires that the appellant's brief be submitted to be CAB in question, 
with copies for members of the CAB and for each party involved in the conflict. The CAB, 
in turn, sends copies to the Federal Court of Appeals. If the Court considers that the 
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plaintiff-worker wi)) not be able to support himself or his family needs while the appeal is 
proceeding, the defendant may be ordered to pay the plaintiff whatever the appellate court 
considers necessary as support during the appeal process. When the appellant is from 
labor, the Court of Appeals is bound by Article 76 of the Law of Appeals (Ley de Amparo) 
and must correct deficiencies in the appeHants' brief including a review of the record and 
even possibly rewrite the appellant's arguments.24 
C. SETILEMENT OF DISPUTES 
The thrust of Mexico's system of labor-management relations is to seek resolution 
of disputes through conciliation. As has been described above, the system favors negotiated 
settlements between the parties rather than protracted procedures before CABs. Over the 
period from November 1, 1992 to October 31, 1993, 67,112 out of 72,557, or over 92 percent, 
of complaints accepted by FCABs were resolved through conciliation.25 
Role of CABs in Settlements 
In principle, CABs do not intervene in a dispute unless requested to do so by a 
complaining party. The main responsibility of CABs in negotiated settlements regarding 
dismissals is to ensure that the proper severance is paid to the worker. In order for a 
settlement to be valid, it must be approved by a CAB. 
The right of workers to severance payments cannot be renounced. Article 33 of the 
FLL states: 
24 Labor Law Enforcement in Mexico, 2l!. cit., pp. 31-32. 
25 Secreta ria del Trabajo y Previsi6n Social, Informe de Labores, 1992-1993 (Mexico, 
STPS, 1993), p. 63. 
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D. OTHER AGENCIES 
In addition to the CBs and CABs, other agencies of the Government of Mexico have 
responsibility for enforcing aspects of labor law. These agencies, and the area of 
responsibility of each, are:27 
• Secretaria del Trabajo y Prerisi6n Social (Secretariat of Labor and Social 
Welfare, STPS) •• Responsible for the application of Article 123 of· the 
Constitution (including minimum wage, right to strike, etc.) through the FLL 
and its regulations. Supervises, from an administrative standpoint, the 
FCABs, the Labor Inspection Department, and the Office of the Labor Public 
Defenders. 
• Secretaria de Educaci6n (Secretariat of Education) •• Responsible for enforcing 
laws and regulations related to employer obligations to train workers and, 
together with STPS, for training workers. 
• Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito PUblico (Secretariat of Finance and Public 
Credit) .. Responsible for the administration of the mandatory profit sharing 
provisions of the FLL. 
Procuraduria de la Derensa del Trabajo (Office of the Labor Public 
Defenders) •• Responsible for providing workers with counsel before any 
authority in matters related to the enforcement of labor law and regulations. 
They file for ordinary or special proceedings for the defense of individual 
workers or unions, propose to interested parties ways to solve disputes, and 
formalize settlements between workers and management. 
• Departamento de Inspecci6n del Trabajo (Labor Inspection Department) •• 
Responsible for overseeing compliance with labor laws and regulations, 
including making workers and management aware of the laws and 
regulations, and giving notice regarding violations of labor law. In particular, 
the Labor Inspection Department is responsible for compliance with worker 
safety and health laws and regulations. 
Servicio Nacional de Empleo, Capacitaci6n y Adiestramiento (National 
Employment and Training Service)·· Responsible for analyzing labor markets, 
encouraging the employment of workers, and promoting and supervising the 
27 Labor Law Enforcement in Mexico, !ill. cit., pp. 22.23; and Questions on Labor Law 
Enforcement in Mexico, !ill. cit., pp. 26·29. 
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A workers' waiver of accrued salaries, indemnifications, and 
other benefits derived from services rendered is null and void, 
whatever its form or designation may be. 
In order to be valid, every agreement or settlement of account 
shall be in writing and shall contain a detailed statement of the 
facts which give rise to it and of the rights included therein. It 
shall be ratified before the Conciliation and Arbitration Board, 
which shall approve it, provided that it does not contain an 
waiver of the rights of the workers. 
Thus, the Presidents of the CABs are required to monitor severance payments, ensuring that 
the rights of workers are not being voided and workers receive, directly, the full amount of 
the severance payments that is due them. Article 949 of the FLL directs the President of 
the CAB to ensure that severance payments are made directly to the worker entitled to the 
payment. 
Settlements in Dismissal Cases 
In 1993, the FCABs (including special boards in the Federal District) handled 17,044 
individual complaints, of which 8,068 (47 percent) involved charges of unjustified 
dismissal. 26 According to statistics provided by the Mexican NAO, the vast majority of 
disputes involving dismissal for cause that are resolved in favor of workers are settled 
through the payment of severance rather than through reinstatement. Specifically, the 
Federal Conciliation and Arbitration Boards of the Federal District ruled in favor of 
workers in 2,220 cases of dismissal for cause during the 17·month period from January 
1993 through May 1994. Eighty.five percent of the workers opted for severance pay, while 
15 percent chose to be reinstated. 
26 Questions on Labor Law Enforcement in Mexico, QI!. cit., p. 26, based on information 
from STPS. 
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training of the workforce. 
• Comisi6n Nacional de Salarios Minimos (National Minimum Salaries 
Commission) •• Responsible for setting minimum salaries for different 
occupations and areas of the country. 
• Comisi6n Nacional para Ia Participaci6n de los Trabajadores en las 
Utilidades de las Empresas (National Commission for the Distribution of 
Corporation Net Profits to Workers) •• Responsible for overseeing the 
allocation of net profits of corporations to workers, as required by the FLL. 
• Jurado de ResponsabUidades (Jury of Responsibilities)·.Responsible for 
investigating and sanctioning members of the CABs for inefficiency or 
wrongdoing. 
State Secretariats of Labor carry out the functions of the STPS for matters under state 
jurisdiction. 
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